People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Russell [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
3-22-1957
People ex rel. Department of Public Works v.
Russell [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Russell [DISSENT]" (1957). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 84.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/84
Mar.1957] PEOPLE V. RUSSELL 
[48 C.2d 189; 309 P.2d 10] 
l8:J 
in my dissents in the above cited cases still prevails and 
will be invoked in future cases involving will contests so long 
as this court remains as it is now constituted. 
In my opinion the evidence of testamentary incompetency 
is no stronger in this case than it 1vas in any of the cases 
which I have hereinbefore cited, which the majority of this 
court held, as a matter of law, was insufficient to invalidate the 
will involved in those cases, and while a correct conclusion 
is reached by the majority in the case at bar, the reasoning 
of the majority in arriving at such conclusion is out of har-
mony with the settled rule with respect to the function and 
power of an appellate court to review the determination of 
an issue of fact by a trial court. 
[L.A. No. 24315. In Bank. Mar. 22, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE ex rel. Department of Public Works, Ap-
pellant, v. FRED J. RUSSELL, Respondent. 
[1] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Province of Court and Jury.-
In an eminent domain proceeding the amount of compensation 
is to be determined by the jury ( Const., art. I, § 14) ; all other 
issues are to be tried by the court, and if it does not make 
special findings on those issues they are implicit in the verdict 
awarding compensation, which verdict should stand if there 
is substantial evidence to support the implied findings. 
[2] Streets-Rights of Abutter-Easements.-An abutter's ease-
ment of access to a street arises as a matter of law; it is a 
property right enjoyed by the abutter as an incident of his 
ownership of property, and is separate and distinct from the 
right of the general public in and to the street. 
[3] Highways-Rights of Abutter-Easements.-An abutter's right 
of access to a road extends to a use of the road for purposes 
of ingress and egress to his property by such modes of con-
veyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway and in 
'3uch manner as is customary or reasonable; it is more exten-
sive than a mere opportunity to go into the street immediately 
fl] See Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 129, 316; Am.Jur., Emi-
nent Domain, § 316. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Highways and Streets,§ 166 et seq.; Am.Jur .. 
Highways, § 152 et esq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Eminent Domain, § 161; [2] Streets, 
~ 32; [3, 9] Highways,§ 107; [4] Highways, § 62; [5, 6, 8] High-
ways,§ 53; [7] Dedication,§ 68(5). 
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in front of one's property, but does not extend beyond access 
to the next interseetion at either Pnd of the street on which 
the property abut~, :md any ineonvenienees whieh may be 
suffered after such intersection is renehed do not impair the 
easpment hut are inconveniences suift•rPd by him as a member 
of the public. 
[4] Id.-Alteration-Damages.-Highway changes causing diver-
sion of traffic or circuity of travel beyond an intersecting street 
nrc not compensable, though the value of nonabutting property 
may depreciate as a consequence. 
[5] Id.- Condemnation Proceedings- Damages.-HPsults stem-
ming from impron~ments in a state highway on which de-
fendant's propPrty does not nbut nrc not eompensa ble in a 
condP11mation proc<•eding im·olving the taking of part of de-
fpndant's property for an adjacc>nt county road. 
[6] Id.- Condemnation Proceedings- Severance Damages.-- For 
the purpo~e of determining severance dnmages it is immaterial 
whether defendant owns the underlying fee in a county road 
or has only an easement therein by renson of his ownership 
of a butting property, :mel a determination of the particular 
rond purposes to whieh a parkway on the oppo~ite side of tlw 
road from defendant's property should be put is within the 
diseretion of the county. 
[7] Dedication-Rights of Public.-\Yith changing conditions of 
travel, a city or a county has the right to adapt and appropriate 
its highways from time to time to such uses as are within the 
tPrms of the dedication and are conducive to the enjoyment 
by the public of the highway. 
[8] Highways-Condemnation Proceedings-Damages.-The mere 
possibility that a parkway on the opposite side of a county 
road from defendant's property might have been devoted to 
tlw use of Yehicular traffic, should the county so determine, is 
too speculative and rPmote to be the basis of an award of 
damages for elimination of such parkway, in a condemnation 
proeeeding. 
[9] !d.-Rights of Abutter.-In the proper exercise of its police 
power in the regulation of traffic, a state or county may do 
mnny things which are not compensable to an abutting prop-
erty owner, such as construeting n traffic island, placing divid-
ing strips which deprive an abutter of direct access to the 
opposite side of the highway, painting double white lines on 
the highway, or designnting the entire street as a one-way 
street. 
APPEAI1 from 
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Condemnation proceedings. .Judgment awarding defendant 
damages, modified and affirmed. 
George C. Hadley, William E. Fisher, Jr., and Robert F. 
Carlson for Appellant. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke 
Jones, Assistant City Attorney, Peyton H. Moore, ,Jr., and 
\Veldon L. Weber, Deputy City Attorneys, as Amici Curiae 
011 behalf of Appellant. 
Douglas L. Edmonds and Hodge L. Dolle for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-The plaintiff appeals from those portions of 
a judgment in condemnation, entered upon a verdict, award-
ing actual and severance damages for the taking of Parcel 1 
as shown by the maps in evidence and arising out of the con-
struction of an improvement in the county road upon which 
his property abuts. The property is located in Los Angeles 
County. 
As shown by the maps, the block in which the defendant's 
property is located fronts on a county road known as Firestone 
Boulevard and is bounded by Elmcroft and Ringwood Ave-
nues. His property, indicated as Lot 46, does not abut on 
those streets. A state highway, also known as Firestone Boule-
vard, runs parallel and contiguous to the county road in an 
east-west direction. Reconstruction of the state highway was 
undertaken in order to provide a railway overpass. This 
resulted in raising the grade of that highway, the taking of a 
portion of the county road right-of-way for the maintenance 
of an embankment to support the overpass, the closing of any 
ac~cess to the state highway at Ringwood Avenue, and provid-
ing for a new access to that highway at Elmcroft, and it re-
quired the relocation of the county road. This proceeding 
was commenced by the state to obtain an easement for the 
latter purpose across Parcels 1 and 2 of the defendant's 
property. It was proposed to reconstruct the county road so 
as to provide an identical 12-foot width of unimproved park-
way adjoining his property, an identical 28-foot width of 
paved roadway, complete with curbs and gutters, for two-way 
vehicular traffic, and on the same grade as theretofore existed. 
The only difference in the proposed improvement was the 
elimination of a 12-foot unimproved parkway on the opposite 
side of the road from the defendant's property and the conse-
quent diminution of the total right-of-way width of the county 
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road from 52 feet to 40 feet. There was no impairment of 
access from the defendant's property via the county road to 
the next interseeting street in either direction. 
'l'hc defendant's property was unimproved at the time of 
trial. It had been zoned C-1 for limited commercial use in 
1950 at the time the subdivision of which it was a part had 
been accepted. At that time it had been contiguous to the 
state highway. However, the subdivider had been required 
by the county, as a condition to its acceptance of the sub-
division map, to dedicate 52 feet adjoining the state highway 
for the construction of the county road to be paved and im-
proved with a roadway 28 feet in width, with curbs and 
gutters, and a 12-foot unimproved parkway and sidewalk 
area on either side. The subdivider was also required to 
dedicate 60-foot easements for the construction of Elmcroft 
A venue and Ringwood Avenue, to pave 36 feet on Elmcroft 
and 40 feet on Ringwood for vehicular use, and to pave 
Hingwood to the state highway right-of-way line. Defendant, 
who was then an officer in the subdivision company and who 
participated in the dedication, later acquired the property in 
question. He owns the underlying fee in the county road. 
The evidence at the trial consisted principally of the testi-
mony of two expert witnesses Ross and Little for the defend-
ant and two expert witnesses Elliott and Smith for the plain-
tiff, and a view by the jury and the court of the premises 
after the construction of the improvements. 
Witness Little testified that the taking of Parcel 1, which 
constituted only about 5 per cent of the larger parcel owned 
l:Jy the defendant, did not, in his opinion, reduce the value 
of the highest and best use to which the remainder of the 
defendant's property could be put. There was some variance 
in the opinions of the four witnesses as to the fair market 
value of this parcel but the parties do not now dispute the 
amount of the award made by the jury and the judgment, 
namely, $3,848.64. This leaves for consideration on this appeal 
the question as to the award of severance damages resulting 
from the construction of the improvement. 
It was the theory of the plaintiff that the proposed improve-
ment did not impair any legally compensable right of the 
defendant; that all of the rights enjoyed by him in connection 
with the ownership of his property were appurtenant to the 
county road and not to the state highway; that there had 
been no impairment of his rights as an abutter on the county 
Mar. 1957] PEOPLE v. RussELL 
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1·oad to air, light, view, or access; that the diminution in 
total right-of-way width by the elimination of the unimproved 
parkway across the road did not constitute a substantial im-
pairment of his right of access to and from that road, and that 
before the question of the damages to which the defendant 
might be entitled for impairment of access to the county 
road could be submitted to the jury, the court was required 
to determine as a matter of law that there had been a sub-
stantial impairment. It was the theory of the defendant, at 
the outset of the trial, that he was entitled to compensation 
for the loss of access to the state highway at Ringwood A venue 
and because of the raising of the grade of that highway. 
Pending the ruling of the court evidence was offered to show 
that his remaining property had been depreciated in value 
the construction of improvements in the state highway. 
After deliberation and near to the close of the trial the court 
ruled that these were not compensable items of damage and 
instructed the jury not to consider them in reaching its ver-
diet. No claim was asserted as to any loss of impairment of 
the defendant's right to air, light or view by the improvement 
in the county road. 
Each of the defendant's witnesses testified that in their 
opinion the highest and best use of the remainder of his 
property had been changed from a retail commercial develop-
ment to a residential development. "'Witness Ross estimated 
the severance damages eaused by the reconstruction of the 
county road at $69,373, using as the basis for this estimate 
the faet that the road in front of the defendant's property 
\Yas too narrow for servieing commereial property and that 
by the reduction of the total right-of-way width to 40 feet 
the road no longer had the potential of an additional paved 
width, and he considered 40 feet too narrow for the use 
of vehicles of the type used to serve commereial property. 
·witness Little estimated the severance damages at $68,034, 
using as the basis for his estimate the erection of the state 
highway ramp, the closing of the Ringwood Avenue access, 
and the inadequacy of a 40-foot street to service eommercial 
property. He made no breakdown of these faetors in his 
computation. Two of these were later held by the court to 
be non-eompensable. When he was asked to consider only 
the diminution in right-of-way width in estimating the sever-
ance damages, he did not change the amount of his estimate. 
Yet when asked if he thought that the closing of Ringwood 
48 C.2d-7 
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Avenue was an additional reason to persuade a present buyer 
that the property was no longer commercial property but 
residential property, he replied ''I don't think any buyer 
would buy property for commercial property if Ringwood 
A venue was closed off.'' 
It was the contention of the defendant throughout the trial 
that the loss sustained by him was not a question of access 
but of changing the highest and best use of his property by 
the narrowing of the right-of-way, the original width of which 
had been established by the local authorities as being necessary 
for serving this commercially-zoned property and in which 
original width he owned the underlying fee. The trial court 
properly treated this as a question of access to the county 
road. However it refused to determine as a matter of law that 
there had been no substantial impairment of this right, leav-
ing this determination to the jury as a question of fact. The 
jury was instructed that the defendant had a private right in 
the county road of reasonable access by such modes of con-
veyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway, and to 
a road of a width which was adequate to serve his property, 
considering the uses to which it was adapted and available. 
If the jury should find in accordance with this definition 
that the defendant's right of access had not been substantially 
impaired, it was instructed to find that the defendant had 
suffered no compensable damage by reason thereof. One of 
the jurors asked whether the landowner has the right to say 
what can be done with that right-of-way for the use of his 
own property, whether he could have paved those 12 feet on 
the opposite side of the road, or did that strip of land belong 
to the county and had to be reserved for curbs or sidewalks. 
After a colloquy between court and counsel, he was informed 
that "the area dedicated to the County of Los Angeles for 
road purposes may be improved and used for general road 
and street purposes which includes pavement, sidewalk area, 
curbs, parkway, which ultimate improvement is determined by 
the County of Los Angeles according to need of the sur-
rounding area.'' The jury returned a verdict of $33,499.83 
for the severance damages for impairment of the defendant's 
right of access in and to this county road. 
The plaintiff urges that the trial court should have deter-
mined as a matter of law from the facts presented that there 
had been no substantial impairment of defendant's right of 
access to this road; and that the evidence does not disclose any 
legally compensable injury suffered by the defendant from 
1 PEOPLE v. RussELI, 
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the county roac1 improvement. The defendant urges that by 
its judgment on the verdict the court determined that there 
"·as substantial impairment as a matter of law, and that sub-
stantial evidenee supports the judgment. 
[1] In an eminent domain proceeding the amount of com-
is to be determined by the jury. ( Const., art. I, 
14.) All other issues are to be tried by the court, and if 
it does not make speeial findings on those issues they are 
implicit in the verdict awarding eompensation. (People v. 
Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 402 [144 P.2d 799] and eases cited.) 
rrhe verdict should stand if there is substantial evidence to 
support the implied finding. 
[2] An abutter's easement of access arises as a matter of 
law (Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713 [123 P.2d 505] ). It is a 
property right enjoyed by the abutter as an incident of his 
o\men:hip of property, and is separate and distinct from the 
right of the general public in and to the street. ·while certain 
general rules have been set forth in the various decisions which 
have considered the nature and scope of this right, eaeh case 
must be considered upon its own facts. [3] The right of 
access has been defined as extending to a use of the road for 
purposes of ingress and egress to his property by such modes 
of conveyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway 
and in such manner as is customary or reasonable. (Rose v. 
State, S1tpra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 728.) It is more extensive than 
a mere opportunity to go into the street immediately in front 
of one's property. (Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 
343 [144 P.2d 818] .) However it does not extend beyond 
access to the next intersection at either end of the street 
upon which the property abuts. (Beckham v. City of Stock-
ton, 64 Cal.App.2d 487 r149 P.2d 296].) Any inconveniences 
which may be suffered after such intersection is reached do 
not impair the easement but are inconveniences suffered by 
him as a member of the public. [4] Highway changes eaus-
ing div0rsion of traffic or circuity of travel beyond an inter-
secting street are not compensable. (People v. Ricciardi, 
supra, 23 Cal.2d 390, 401-402) even though the value of non-
abutting property may depreciate as a consequence thereof. 
In those cases in which substantial impairment has been 
found as a matter of law from a reduction in ·width of a paved 
street or sidewalk area different factual situations were pre-
sentccl. In Rose v. State, .mpra, 19 Ca1.2d 713, the elimination 
of a grade crossing and the construction of a subway left a 
196 PEOPLE v. RUSSELL [48 C.2d 
14-foot lane for two-way vehicular traffic and a 3-foot side-
walk in front of industrial property. In Eaclws v. City of 
Los Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147], 
the construction of a street improvement left a 10-foot strip 
for vehicular use in front of the plaintiff's property. In Lane 
v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co., 208 Cal. 29 [280 P. 109], an im-
provement was constructed so close to the plaintiff's premises 
that a vehicle could not be parked in front of it while a 
streetcar passed by. In McCandless v. City of Los Angeles, 
214 Cal. 67 [4 P.2d 139], an improvement was constructed 
7 feet from the plaintiff's property line. These may be readily 
distinguished from the present case where the parkway ad-
joining the defendant's property and the paved street area for 
vehicular traffic were of exactly the same width and grade and 
bore the same relationship to the defendant's property as 
theretofore. Any inconvenience to the use of this property for 
commercial purpose because of these widths was no greater as 
a result of the improvement. [5] Much of the defendant's argu-
ment is devoted to a discussion of results stemming from the 
improvements in the state highway. His property does not 
abut thereon and the court properly ruled that these matters 
are not compensable. 
[6] For the purpose of determining severance damages 
it is immaterial whether the defendant owns the underlying 
fee in the county road or has only an easement therein by 
reason of his ownership of abutting property. (Eachtts v. 
Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 618 [37 P. 750, 42 
Am.St.Rep. 149] .) The entire right-of-way had been dedicated 
for county road purposes. The determination of the par-
ticular road purposes to which the opposite parkway should 
be put was within the discretion of the county. The de-
fendant could not have required the county to put it to 
any particular road use nor could he have used that strip 
for any special purpose of his own inconsistent with the full 
enjoyment of the right of way by the public. ( Gttrnscy v. 
Northern Calif. Power Co., 160 Cal. 699, 705 [117 P. 906, 36 
hR.A.N.S. 185]; Colegrove Water Co. v. City of Hollywood, 
151 Cal. 425, 429-430 [90 P. 1053, 13 L.R.A.N.S. 904] ; 
Hayes v. Handley, 182 Cal. 273, 282 [187 P. 952]; Airways 
Water Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 106 Cal.App.2d 787, 
790 [236 P.2d 199] ; People v. Henderson, 85 Cal.App.2d 653, 
657 [194 P.2d 91].) [7] With changing conditions of travel, 
a city or a county has the right to adapt and appropriate its 
highways from time to time to such uses as are within the 
:Mar. PEOPLE v. RussELL 
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terms of the dedication and are conducive to the enjoyment 
by the public of the highway. ( W attson v. Eldridge, 207 
Cal. 314 [278 P. 236]; Airways Water Co. v. County of Los 
Angeles, sltpra, 106 Cal.App.2d 787, 790.) [8] The mere 
possibility that the opposite parkway might have been de-
voted to the use of vehicular traffic, should the county so 
determine, was too speculative and remote to be the basis of 
an award of damages. ( Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 
94 Cal.App.2d 180, 192 [210 P.2d 717].) 
[9] In the proper exercise of its police power in the regu-
lation of traffic, a state or county may do many things which 
are not compensable to an abutting property owner, such as 
constructing a traffic island, placing permanent dividing strips 
which deprive an abutter of direct access to the opposite side 
of the highway, painting double white lines on the highway, 
or designating the entire street as a one-way street. (jVcDonald 
v. State, 130 Cal.App.2d 793, 799 [279 P.2d 777] ; People v. 
Sayig, 101 Cal.App.2d 890 [226 P.2d 702] ; Holman v. State, 
97 Cal.App.2d 237 [217 P.2d 448]; Beckham v. C1"ty of Stock-
ton, 64 Cal.App.2d 487 [149 P.2d 296].) Amici curiae urge 
that the use of the parkway as a traffic separation strip 
between the state highway and the county road is proper 
in the control of traffic, and as such presents no valid claim 
for damages. Under the factual situation here presented this 
contention is sustained. 
No substantial impairment of the defendant's right of ac-
cess to the county road is disclosed by the evidence and the 
eourt should have instructed the jury to that effect. Any find-
ing of the court to the contrary implied from the fact that 
the question of severance damages was submitted to the jury 
is not supported by the evidence. 
In view of what has been said other contentions raised on 
appeal need not be discussed. 
The judgment awarding damages for the taking of Parcell 
is affirmed. The judgment is modified by striking therefrom 
the award for severance damages for the taking of Parcel 1. 
As so modified the judgment is affirmed; the defendant to 
recover costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, ,J., and Spence, ,J., eoncnrred. 
SCHAUER, J.-In my view the opinion prepared for the 
District Court of Appeal by Justice Fourt and concurred in 
by Presiding Justice White and Justice Doran (reported in 
198 PEoPLE v. RussELL [48 C.2d 
(Cal.App.) 299 P.2d 920) adequately discusses and correctly 
resolves the questions presented on this appeal. For the 
reasons therein stated I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
McComb, .J., concurred. 
CARTER, ,J.-I dissent. 
When this case was before the District Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District, Division One, an opinion was pre-
pared by l\fr. Justice Fourt affirming the judgment of the 
trial court. 'fhis opinion was concurred in by Mr. Presiding 
Justice White and by l\fr. Justice Doran. The views expressed 
in said opinion are in accord with my concept of the law on 
this subject and I adopt said opinion as my dissenting opinion 
from the majority opinion herein. 
''This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment in a 
condemnation action wherein the defendant was awarded 
severance damages in the sum of $33,499.83. 
'' 'l'he action was brought to acquire an easement for public 
road and highway purposes over property described in the 
complaint. The complaint alleges that the parcel to be taken 
is a part of a larger parcel and the prayer asks that damages 
incidental to the taking be ascertained and assessed. The 
answer admits that the parcel to be taken is only a part of a 
larger parcel and alleges that the taking and the construction 
of the improvement cause a damage. The issue of damages is 
therefore joined by the pleadings of the parties. 
''The parcel to be taken was unimproved, about 287 feet in 
length and varied in width from 6 feet to 28 feet and was 
about 5,064 square feet in area. That parcel was a part of a 
larger parcel all owned by the defendant. The larger parcel 
was generally rectangular in shape with an area of about 
105,000 square feet. The entire property in question was 
zoned for commercial usage, fronting and abutting upon the 
north side of a county road called Firestone Boulevard, here-
inafter referred to as the County road. The County road 
consisted of a dedicated right of way 52 feet in width, of 
which the center 28 feet had been paved allowing for vehicular 
and other travel in both directions and complete with curbs 
and gutters on each side. The County road ran parallel to, and 
adjoined on the south side, State Highway Route Number 
17 4, also known as Firestone Boulevard, hereinafter referred 
to as the State highway. There was no connection or paved 
:Mar. 1957] PEoPLE v. RussELL 
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crossover between the State highway and the County road 
along their common boundary. Pigure 1 illustrates the 'be-
fore' position and measurements of the defendant's property 
and its relationship to the roadways. Pigure 2 illustrates the 
'after' position and measurements of the defendant's prop-
erty and its relationship to the road1Yays. (See post, pages 
200 and 201.) 
'' 'rhe relocation of the County road was necessitated by the 
widening of the State highway for the construction of a rail-
road overpass. The reconstruction of the County road re-
sulted in the elimination of a 12-foot strip on the south side 
of the County road. In other words, the County road was re-
duced from 52 feet to 40 feet in width, or a reduction of about 
i1yenty-three (23) per cent, although the paved portion of 
the road remained the same. In addition, a paved connection 
between the County road and the State highway was con-
structed where Elmcroft A venue and the State high·way con-
n ret. 
''The evidence indicated that respondent's damages were 
not based upon any loss of light, air or view with respect to 
the County road, thereby resolving the matter to the question 
of loss or impairment of access. 
''Appellant asserts that the sole question presented by 
this appeal is whether the trial court erred in not ruling as a 
matter of law that respondent's easement of access in and to 
the abutting County road had not been substantially im-
paired. It is appellant's contention that since the uncon-
tradicted evidence showed that the road had been recon-
structed in exactly the same relationship to the land as to 
the grade, width of roadway, and intervening parkway strip. 
the only difference being the elimination of an unimproved 
J 2 foot wide strip on the other side of the County road SP])-
arating and dividing that road from a heavily traveled State 
highway, there was no substantial loss or impairment of re-
~-;pondent 's right of access. 
''The property in question was a part of a subdivision 
known as Tract Number 16767, apparently developed in about 
1950. The political subdivision having control of subdivisions 
at that time imposed certain conditions and requirements on 
the subdividers, among such conditions and requirements 
being that a road (the County road here) 52 feet in width be 
dedicated to the county; that, at the property owners' ex-
pense, it be paved with a roadway 28 feet in width. that it br 
provided with curbs and gutters and that a 12 foot parkway 
200 PEOPLE v. RussELL [48 0.2d 
Figure 1-Before Construction. 
and sidewalk area be provided on each side of the paved and 
curbed roadway. The subdivision map was recorded on 
October 31, 1950. Apparently, the subdividers complied sub-
stantially with all of the conditions and requirements made by 
the political subdivisions concerned with the property. 
"As stated in Bacick v. Board of Contra~, 23 Cal.2d 343, 
at pages 349-350 [144 P.2d 818] : 'It has long been recog-
nized in this state and elsewhere that an owner of property 
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abutting upon a public street has a property right in the 
nature of an easement in the street which is appurtenant to 
his abutting property and which is his private right, as dis-
tinguished from his right as a member of the public. That 
right has been described as an easement of ingress and egress 
to and from his property or, generally, the right of access 
over the street to and from his property, and compensation 
must be given for an impairment thereof.' 
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''Also, in People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, the court 
stated, at page 397 l144 P.2d 799]: 'The courts of this state, 
from time immemorial and in cases too numerous to mention, 
have declared and enforced the abutting property owner's 
right to a free and convenient use of and access to the high-
way on which his property abuts. (Citing cases.) It was 
declared in the case of Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. By. Co., 
supra, 103 Cal. 614 [37 P. 570, 42 Am.St.Hep. 149], at p. 617, 
that this right of ingress and egress attaches to the lot and 
is a right of property as fully as is the lot itself and any 
act by which that easement is destroyed or substantially im-
paired for the benefit of the public, is a damage to the lot itself, 
within the meaning of the constitutional provision under 
which the owner is entitled to compensation. 
'' 'It is also the settled law that ''An abutting owner has 
two kinds of rights in a highway, a public right which he 
enjoys in common with all other citizens, and certain private 
rights which arise from his ownership of property contiguous 
to the highway, and which are not common to the public 
generally; . . . An abutting landowner on a public highway 
has a special right of easement and user in the public road for 
access purposes, and this is a property right which cannot be 
damaged or taken away from him without due compensation. 
[Citing cases.]" (Lane v. San Diego Elec. By. Co., 208 Cal. 
29, 33 [280 P. 109] .) ' 
"In Bose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, at pages 727-728 [123 
P.2d 505], the court said: "l'he abutting owner's easement of 
access arises as a matter of law ... and its nature and extent 
have been set forth in the numerous decisions which have 
considered the question. Thus, it is established that the ease-
ment of access is a matter of law peculiar to the individual 
owner, and an unreasonable interference with such an ease-
ment is an injury necessarily different from the injury suf-
fered by the general public .... It is an easement in the 
public highway upon which his land fronts. (Citing cases.) 
The right extends to a use of the highway for purposes of 
ingress and egress to his property by such modes of convey-
ance and travel as are appropriate to the highway and in such 
manner as is customary or reasonable. (See Lewis, Eminent 
Domain (3d ed.), p. 190.) ' 
''The appellant here contends that the right of access does 
not extend to the full width of the dedicated right-of-way, 
but only to the paved portion thereof and that therefore there 
was no substantial loss or impairment of respondent's right 
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aecess since a duplicate paved portion of equal size has 
been provided. 
''In support of its contentions appellant cites Rose v. State, 
supra; Beckham v. City of Stockton, 64 Cal.App.2d 487 [149 
P.2d 296]; McDonald v. State, 130 Cal.App.2d 793 [279 
P.2<l 777]; Brown v. Board of S1tpervisors, 124 Cal. 274 [57 
P. 82], and Bigley v. N1Inan, 53 Cal. 403. 
''All of the cited cases are distinguishable from the case 
now before us. In the Beckham case the complainant owned 
property, no part of which was taken for construction, and 
which \Yas beyond the intersection and within the first block 
from the street in question. In the construction an under-
pass was made and as a result thereof claimants could no longer 
go directly from their property across the next intersecting 
street and to the downtown area. The court held that mere 
inconvenience and circuity of travel beyond an intersecting 
street resulting from the construction of an improvement 
therein do not furnish a basis for recovery of damages by 
landowners whose properties abut on a street which inter-
sects the street on which the improvement is constructed; 
that in order for the landowner to recover there must be an 
infringement of some right which he possesses in connection 
with his property; and such property right is that of reason-
able use of the street fronting the property in either direc-
tion to the next interseetion. Such right the plaintiffs still had. 
''In the McDonald case, plaintiffs claimed damages becausr 
they formerly passed directly across the county road, upon 
which their property fronted, to and into a state highway 
which lay next to and parallel with the county road. The state 
had constructed a wall 11 feet inside of the county road thus 
making· direct passage to the state highway impossible, and 
necessitating travel on the county road to the next inter-
secting street before the state highway could be entered. A 
drmurrer to the second amended complaint was sustained be-
cause the pleadings showed that appellants did not own 
property abutting on the state highway and did not have 
direct access thereto. The appellate court stated, at page 797: 
'However, appellants do not complain of the fact that the wall 
1vas placed within the original surface area of the county 
road rather than upon its eommon boundary with the state 
higlrway. 'rhey claim only that their abutters' rights in the 
state highway have been damaged .... Thus, the real issue 
presented is whether or not the appellants, upon the construc-
tion of tho state highway, ipso facto aequired a right to have 
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no barrier erected between said state highway and that portion 
of Plumas Street (county road) upon which their properties 
abutted.' 
"Brown v. Board of Supervisors, sttpra, 124 Cal. 27 4, 
merely holds that the narrowing of a street is not ipso facto 
an impairment of the right of access. The board of supervisors 
of the city and county of San Francisco passed an order de-
claring the northerly 31 feet of Turk Street to be closed and 
vacated. The owner of the lands abutting upon the southerly 
side of the street instituted proceedings for a review of the 
action of the board and a judgment anulling the order upon 
the ground that in adopting it the board acted in excess of 
its jurisdiction. The court held that the act of the board was 
a legislative act performed in the exercise of a discretionary 
power intrusted to them as a legislative body and that it was 
not the exercise of any judicial function which may be re-
viewed upon certiorari. In answer to the contention that 
the board had no jurisdiction to adopt the order without at 
the same time providing for an assessment of damage that 
would be sustained thereby and providing for its payment, 
the court stated, at pages 280-281 : 'The property which an 
abutting owner has in the street in front of his land is the 
right of access and of light and air, and for an infringement 
of these rights he is entitled to compensation .... The ap-
pellants herein do not, however, claim that the reduction in 
the width of the street will in any respect interfere with their 
enjoyment of light and air, or that acce:;;s to their lots is in 
any degree impaired .... The damage which the appel1ants 
may sustain by reason of a diminution in value of their 
lands is not damage for which they are entitled to com-
pensation. (Citing cases.) ' 
"Bigley v. Nunan, supra, 53 Cal. 403, was not a condemna-
tion proceeding but was an action to abate a nuisance caused 
by the erection of a fence in the highway in front of plaintiff's 
property, and for damages. The access from the plaintiff's 
lot to the street had not been cut off or impeded. The court 
held that if plaintiff and his immediate neighbors had more 
occasion to pass through the street than the public at large, 
this was an inconvenience in degree only and was not an in-
jury in kind different from that sustained by the public; that 
the nuisance may be abated or removed, and to give damages 
on account of the decreased value of the land would be to give 
damages for all the injury the premises would ever sustain, 
which would be clearly wrong. 
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''In a majority of the cases in other jurisdictions the right 
an owner of property to compensation for damages suf-
fered by the narrowing of a street in front of his premises 
has been sustained, even where the portion vacated is on the 
side of the street. (18 Am.Jur. 860; 49 A.L.R. 1255.) 
In City of Tttlsa v. Hindman, 128 Okla. 169 [261 P. 910, 55 
A.I,.R. 891], it was held that where a city widens or opens a 
street for automobile and motor-truck traffic to its entire 
thereby consuming all space theretofore assigned and 
set apart for sidewalks or foot roads, it is liable to abutting 
property owners for any consequential damages resulting to 
such property. 
"In Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465 [252 P. 111, 49 A.L.R. 
1249], the south 13 feet of a street were vacated over the 
protests of the landowners whose property abutted the op-
posite side. 'l'he court in holding that the resulting damage 
was compensable, stated, at page 113 [252 P.]: 'We think 
it also clear under the uniform weight of authority that one 
who is an abutting property owner upon a street or alley, 
any portion or the whole of which is sought to be vacated, 
has a special right and a vested interest in the right to use 
the whole of the street for ingress and egress, light, view, and 
air, and, if any damages are suffered by such an owner, com-
pensation is recoverable therefor. It follows therefore, that 
if appellants' light, air, view, or access is materially dimin-
ished, as alleged in the complaint, they are entitled to have 
the same passed upon by a jury regularly impaneled to deter-
mine the amount thereof. Ridgway v. City of Osceola, 139 
Iowa 590 [117 N.W. 974]. 
'' 'Respondents contend that the vested interest of an 
abutting property owner in a street extends only to the middle 
of the street, and that therefore appellants are not abutting 
property owners as to the 13 feet vacated, which is across the 
street. But this position is untenable. Carried to its logical 
conclusion, the council could vacate all the street opposite 
appellants' property, leaving but a 30-foot street, and still 
appellants have no cause for complaint because not abutting 
owners. Yet there can be no doubt that, under most circum-
stances, property on a street only 30 feet in width would not 
be as valuable as on one twice as wide, for there would be only 
half as much space for light, air, view, and means of access. 
An abutting property owner's vested interest is to the full 
width of the street in front of his land, and he is entitled to 
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use the whole thereof for egress and ingress, light, air, and 
view, and for any substantial or material diminution of any 
of these rights he is entitled t,o recover in damages.' 
"Appellant further contends that the trial court, as a 
matter of law, must make a finding as to whether the abutter's 
rights of access have been substantially impaired, prior to 
submitting the matter to the jury. It is true that it is within 
the province of the trial court, and not the jury, to pass 
upon the question whether under the facts presented the 
abutting landowner's right of access will be substantially 
impaired. However, this the trial court did when it ruled 
on the admission of evidence and in its instructions to the 
jury. Also, if the court does not make special findings on 
the issue its findings thereon are implicit in the verdict 
awarding compensation. (People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 
Cal.2d 390.) 
''Two witnesses testified for respondent and each stated 
that it was his opinion that there was a damage to the remain-
ing parcel. One witness stated that it was his opinion that 
such damage was $69,373, and the other testified that it was 
his opinion the damage was $68,034. Each testified that by 
reason of the relocation and construction of the county road 
the highest and best use of respondent's property had changed 
from a retail commercial development to a residential de-
velopment. The court and jury viewed the property, the area 
and the constructed improvement. 'rhe trial judge was in a 
position to and, in our opinion, he did fairly exercise his 
discretionary power. His view of the property and of the 
construction by the state is independent evidence to support 
the determination or finding implicit in the verdict that an 
impairment of access existed. (Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 
Cal.2d 647, 654 [122 P.2d 576]; Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. 
App.2d 348, 366 [203 P.2d 37] ; City of Oakland v. Adams, 
37 Cal.App. 614, 617 [174 P. 947]; Hatton v. Gregg, 4 Cal. 
App. 537, 540-541 [88 P. 592] .) In the case of Cottnty of 
San Diego v. Bank of America, 135 Cal.App.2d 143, at page 
149 [286 P.2d 880], the court stated as follows: 'It is the rule 
in California that in a condemnation action, in absence of a 
showing of passion or prejudice, the finding of a jury when 
supported by substantial evidence \vill not be set aside on 
appeal. (Citing cases.)' 
"Also, in Rose v. State, st~pra, 19 Cal.2d 713, at pages 728-
729, the court said : 'It is well settled that where there is evi-
dence to support a finding that substantial and unreasonable 
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with tl1e land-crwner's easement of access or 
of ingress and egress has been caused as the result of an 
ob:struction in the street or highway on which his property 
ab !its, an appellate court will not say as a matter of law that 
sneh finding is erroneous. ( 0 'Connor v. Sonthern Pac. Co., 
22 Cal. 681 P. 688]; Smith v. Southern Pac. Co., 146 
Cal. Hi4 [79 P. 868, 106 .Am.St.Hep. 17]; Fairchild v. Oakland 
Bay Shore Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 629 [169 P. 388].) 
'' 'The issues before the trial court in the case at bar were, 
·whether plaintiffs' rights of access to Jackson Street was 
substantially and unreasonably impaired by the construction 
of the snbway, and if so, the amount of damage suffered as the 
resnlt of such interference. These matters are for the trier 
of the facts and only where the evidence does not support a 
fincl ing of substantial and unreasonable interference should 
the conrt decide the issue as a matter of law.' 
"The case of Anderson v. State, 61 Cal..App.2d 140 [142 
P.2d 88], holds that the view alone will support a verdict if 
it is within the range of testimony. The trial court heard the 
1 estimony of all witnesses, received and examined all exhibits, 
yieiYed the property, and reweighed the evidence before deny-
ing appellant's motion for new triaL (See People v. Aclam-
gon, 118 Cal.App.2d 714, 725 [258 P.2d 1020].) 
''Appellant further contends that there were errors of la-w 
Hmnnitted which were prejudicial to it. It is claimed that 
the testimony of the witness Little for the respondent should 
lutn' been stricken. The substance of the testimony of the 
1Yitness \Yas that before the construction the remaining prop-
erty was adapted to commercial activities and that after the 
reduction of the street the remaining property was no longer 
commercial ; that the county road is now too narrow to service 
a commercial development and that the remaining property 
eannot now be utilized for commercial activities and is there-
fore less valuable. The testimony was proper and the motion 
to strike it \Yas properly denied. Substantially the same 
situation prevailrd as to the testimony of respondent's wit-
ness Hoss. 
"It is our conclusion that there was ample evidence to 
support the judgment and there was no prejudicial error to 
appellant.'' 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was drnird April17, 
HlG7. Cartrr, .T.. Schaner, .T., and McComb, .T., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
